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Are you a selective-realist dialetheist without knowing it?

dc.creatorMartinez-Ordaz, María del Rosario
dc.date2019-10-04
dc.date.accessioned2020-08-21T20:50:48Z
dc.date.available2020-08-21T20:50:48Z
dc.identifierhttps://revistas.unbosque.edu.co/index.php/rcfc/article/view/2411
dc.identifier10.18270/rcfc.v19i38.2411
dc.identifier.urihttp://test.repositoriodigital.com:8080/handle/123456789/11206
dc.descriptionRecently there has been a tendency on the part of some scientific realists to weaken their philosophical theses with respect to the success of science. Some of them have suggested that a satisfactorily realist standpoint should be a highly modest approach to scientific success , leaving many with the impression that scientific realism nowadays is nothing that we once thought it was. In light of that, the main concern of this paper is methodological, here I want to answer the question how far can we push the boundaries of our realist commitments and still be in control of our philosophical claims. In particular, I deal with the issue of how a certain type of weak version of selective realism will necessarily allow for true contradictions, dialetheias –even if that is not desirable. Here I argue that if one presents a very weak characterization of selective realism, one that is in line with contemporary projects, this type of realism will not forbid the possibility of things such as dialetheias. I also claim that, if that is the case, we face the following dilemma: or our general characterization of selective realism is mistaken or selective realists cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of why and how to forbid dialetheias in sciencees-AR
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languagespa
dc.publisherUniversidad El Bosquees-ES
dc.relationhttps://revistas.unbosque.edu.co/index.php/rcfc/article/view/2411/2208
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dc.rightsDerechos de autor 2019 Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Cienciaes-ES
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0es-ES
dc.sourceRevista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia; Vol 19 No 38 (2019): Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Cienciaen-US
dc.sourceRevista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia; ##issue.vol## 19 ##issue.no## 38 (2019): Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Cienciaes-AR
dc.sourceRevista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia; Vol. 19 Núm. 38 (2019): Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Cienciaes-ES
dc.source2463-1159
dc.source0124-4620
dc.source10.18270/rcfc.v19i38
dc.titleAre you a selective-realist dialetheist without knowing it?es-AR
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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