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dc.creatorMejía Rendón, Joan Sebastián
dc.date2019-10-04
dc.date.accessioned2020-08-21T20:50:49Z
dc.date.available2020-08-21T20:50:49Z
dc.identifierhttps://revistas.unbosque.edu.co/index.php/rcfc/article/view/2446
dc.identifier10.18270/rcfc.v19i38.2446
dc.identifier.urihttp://test.repositoriodigital.com:8080/handle/123456789/11207
dc.descriptionEn este trabajo examino la noción de “agencia” y su posible aplicación a la técnica animal. Aunque la teoría clásica de la acción considera que los animales no-humanos no pueden ser agentes debido a su ausencia de lenguaje, los estudios de caso centrados en la capacidad de uso y fabricación de herramientas sugieren que algunos animales pueden tener habilidades técnicas complejas. ¿Podrían los animales ser considerados agentes técnicos? En este trabajo propongo un modelo explicativo para entender la capacidad técnica de algunos animales como cuervos y chimpancés. Aplicando los conceptos de representación motora y planes de acción, defiendo la idea de que ciertos animales deben ser considerados como agentes técnicos en la medida en que éstos son capaces de usar y fabricar ciertas herramientas de acuerdo a planes mentales de acción. Esto se debe a que los animales son capaces de representar objetos y actuar en concordancia de sus representaciones mentales, a pesar de no poseer un lenguaje articulado ni conceptos expresados proposicionalmente. Finalmente, concluyo que existe una técnica por fuera del ámbito humano.es-ES
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languagespa
dc.publisherUniversidad El Bosquees-ES
dc.relationhttps://revistas.unbosque.edu.co/index.php/rcfc/article/view/2446/2205
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dc.rightsDerechos de autor 2019 Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Cienciaes-ES
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0es-ES
dc.sourceRevista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia; Vol 19 No 38 (2019): Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Cienciaen-US
dc.sourceRevista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia; ##issue.vol## 19 ##issue.no## 38 (2019): Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Cienciaes-AR
dc.sourceRevista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia; Vol. 19 Núm. 38 (2019): Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Cienciaes-ES
dc.source2463-1159
dc.source0124-4620
dc.source10.18270/rcfc.v19i38
dc.subjectAgenciaes-ES
dc.subjectUso y fabricación de herramientases-ES
dc.subjectCuervos y Chimpancéses-ES
dc.subjectPlanes de acciónes-ES
dc.subjectRepresentación motora.es-ES
dc.titleLa agencia técnica animal: hacia una explicación de las conductas de uso y fabricación de herramientases-ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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