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Predicting Cyber-Attacks in Industrial SCADA Systems Through The Kalman Filter Implementation

Predicción de ciberataques en sistemas industriales SCADA a través de la implementación del filtro Kalman

dc.creatorQuiroz Tascón, Stephen
dc.creatorZapata Jiménez, Julian
dc.creatorVargas Montoya, Hector Fernando
dc.date2020-05-15
dc.identifierhttps://revistas.itm.edu.co/index.php/tecnologicas/article/view/1586
dc.identifier10.22430/22565337.1586
dc.descriptionIn industrial SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems, knowing the status of each device allows information to be collected on its behavior. In this way, actions can be deduced, and different strategies can be formed to help reduce cyber risk. In this article of applied research, a model of prediction of possible cyber-attacks in a SCADA system is presented. This prediction is made with a Kalman filter. A Kalman filter processes cyber security events captured through an intrusion detection system (applied in a SCADA simulation system) and generates a future projection of the probability of an attack being carried out. With this information, system administrators will be able to make some decisions about how to act against imminent cyber-attacks. An installation of different technological components was carried out and 3 cyberattacks to the SCADA were executed: (i) possible scans, (ii) theft of information and (iii) command and data overwriting generating Denial of Service or DoS. The security events were detected by an intrusion detection system and sent to a software, setup with Kalman filter features to deliver as output the possible predictions of attacks. As a result, the probability of a successful computer attack can be seen from the entries based on the historical events and the applied filter formulas.en-US
dc.descriptionEn los sistemas industriales SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition), conocer el estado de cada dispositivo permite obtener información de su comportamiento. De esta forma se pueden deducir acciones y conformar estrategias diferentes que ayuden a reducir el riesgo cibernético. En este artículo de investigación aplicada, se presenta un modelo de predicción de posibles ciberataques en un sistema SCADA. Dicha predicción se hace con un filtro Kalman. Un filtro Kalman procesa los eventos de ciberseguridad capturados a través de un sistema de detección de intrusos (aplicado en un sistema de simulación de SCADA) y genera una proyección futura de la probabilidad de que se consolide un ataque. Con esta información, los administradores de sistemas podrán tomar alguna decisión sobre cómo actuar frente a inminentes ataques informáticos. Se realizó una instalación de diferentes componentes tecnológicos y se ejecutaron 3 ataques informáticos al SCADA: (i) posibles escaneos, (ii) robo de información y (iii) sobrescritura de comandos y datos generando Denial of Service o DoS. los eventos de seguridad fueron detectados por un sistema de detección de intrusos y enviados a un software configurado con las características del filtro Kalmanpara entregar como salida las posibles predicciones de ataques. Como resultado, se puede ver cómo a partir de las entradas es posible conocer la probabilidad de que un ataque informático sea exitoso con base en los eventos históricos y las fórmulas aplicadas del filtro.es-ES
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dc.publisherInstituto Tecnológico Metropolitano (ITM)en-US
dc.relationhttps://revistas.itm.edu.co/index.php/tecnologicas/article/view/1586/1639
dc.relationhttps://revistas.itm.edu.co/index.php/tecnologicas/article/view/1586/1678
dc.relationhttps://revistas.itm.edu.co/index.php/tecnologicas/article/view/1586/1730
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dc.rightsCopyright (c) 2020 TecnoLógicasen-US
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0en-US
dc.sourceTecnoLógicas; Vol. 23 No. 48 (2020); 249-267en-US
dc.sourceTecnoLógicas; Vol. 23 Núm. 48 (2020); 249-267es-ES
dc.source2256-5337
dc.source0123-7799
dc.subjectCyber-attacken-US
dc.subjectcyber-securityen-US
dc.subjectintrusion detection systemen-US
dc.subjectkalman filteren-US
dc.subjectSupervisory Control and Data Acquisitionen-US
dc.subjectAtaque informáticoes-ES
dc.subjectciberseguridades-ES
dc.subjectfiltro Kalmanes-ES
dc.subjectControl de supervisión y adquisición de datoses-ES
dc.subjectsistema de detección de intrusoses-ES
dc.titlePredicting Cyber-Attacks in Industrial SCADA Systems Through The Kalman Filter Implementationen-US
dc.titlePredicción de ciberataques en sistemas industriales SCADA a través de la implementación del filtro Kalmanes-ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.typeResearch Papersen-US
dc.typeArtículos de investigaciónes-ES


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